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SAE INTERNATIONAL
One fault instance of an ADIRU (Air Data Inertial Reference Unit) on-
board a Boeing 777-2H6ER caused an hazardous accident to Malaysian 
Air flight 124 in 2005, 
• Key question is: could we avoid similar scenario in future system 
design? How? Associated cost?
• Failure has been (partially) described in publically available reports by 
NTSB, and Vanderbilt University, used for study
Introduction
Agenda
1. How to capture architecture key elements using AADL
• Real-time architecture, ARINC653 patterns, etc.
2. Link them to implementation artifacts
• Simulation through code generation
3. Trace them w.r.t. safety analysis objectives
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(from ATSB report 200503722)
About Boeing 777-2H6ER ADIRU
n Multiple levels of redundancy.
n work without maintenance with one fault in each FCA.
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ISIS-11-101 TR by Vanderbilt Univ.
• Four modules
• Two types of ports
The Model in ARINC 653 Architecture 
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1. Capturing architecture key elements using AADL
• Real-time architecture, ARINC653 patterns, etc.
2. Link them to implementation artifacts
• Simulation through code generation
3. Trace them w.r.t. safety analysis objectives
Outline
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International standard promoted by SAE, AS-2C committee
• Released as AS5506 family of standards
• Version 1.0 (2004), version 2 (2009), 2.1 (2012)
• Based on feedback from the aerospace industry
Annex document to address specific needs
• ARINC653, Behavior, data, error modeling, code generation, …
AADL objectives are “to model a system”
• With analysis in mind
• To ease transition from well-defined requirements to the final system : 
code production
Require semantics => any AADL entity has a semantics (natural 
language or formal methods).
AADL: Architecture Analysis & Design Language
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Regular modeling process
• Define sub-system boundaries, interfaces, configuration
• Mixing text, graphics, property editor to manage model complexity
Modeling of the ADIRU with AADL
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Overview of the AADL model
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AADL default semantics check
• Containment hierarchy, applicability of configuration parameters 
(units, types, etc), types of message exchanged, port connection, etc.
ARINC 653 verification plugs-ins
• Part of rich AADL eco-system: OSATE, MASIW, Ocarina, …
• Check connections 
• Validity of ARINC653 Configuration parameters: 
• Major Frame Correctness, Properties of Memory Components, 
Dimensioning of Memory Components, Partitions Bindings, Partitions 
Executions, Separation of Memory
• Additional checks: constraints set by RTOS vendors, e.g. alignment of 
memory segments, max number of threads, etc.
First level of analysis: core and plug-ins
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1. Capturing architecture key elements using AADL
• Real-time architecture, ARINC653 patterns, etc.
2. Link them to implementation artifacts
• Simulation through code generation
3. Trace them w.r.t. safety analysis objectives
Outline
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ARINC653 Executives require an additional configuration file, but …
A (full) AADL model must define all components
• For analysis or code generation purposes
Can derive configuration file from the AADL model
• Implemented in Ocarina, targets DeOS and VxWork653
Part of the model bus philosophy
• One repository that can be mined for various purposes
• Analysis, code generation, management of configuration parameters
AADL and XML configuration data
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AADL: modeling data types
-- Part of the Annex D – Data Modeling Annex
data C_Unsigned_Long_Int
-- This data component defines a C unsigned long int type, with a
-- dual nature The first properties defines its representation in
-- memory, the two last its mapping in C.
properties
Data_Model::Data_Representation => integer;
Data_Model::Number_Representation => unsigned;
Data_Size => 4 bytes;
Source_Language => (C);
Type_Source_Name => "unsigned long int";
end C_Unsigned_Long_Int;
data accData extends C_Unsigned_Long_Int
end accData;
subprogram acc1_dataOutput_spg
features
acc1DataOut: out parameter SHM_DataType::accData;
event_in:   in parameter SHM_DataType::actionData;
end acc1_dataOutput_spg;
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Binding code to AADL components
Mapping from AADL model to code
AADL and subprograms
subprogram acc1_dataOutput_spg
features
acc1DataOut: out parameter SHM_DataType::accData;
event_in:   in parameter SHM_DataType::actionData;
properties
Source_Language => (C);
Source_Name =>"acc1dataoutput";
Source_Text => ("../../../acc_code.o");
end acc1_dataOutput_spg;
subprogram acc1_dataOutput_spg
features
acc1DataOut: out parameter SHM_DataType::accData;
event_in:   in parameter SHM_DataType::actionData;
end acc1_dataOutput_spg;
void acc1_dataOutput_spg ( /* C */
(acc1DataOut *SHM_DataType_accData,
event_in:   SHM_DataType_actionData);
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The AADL architecture has all details about
• task, queues, buffers, etc.
• used for schedulability analysis, generation of ARINC653 
configuration
Ocarina: massive code generation
• Take advantage of global knowledge to optimize code, and generate 
only what is required
• Reduce as much as possible error-prone and tedious tasks
Targets DeOS and VxWorks 653
• See all demos and videos from http://aadl.info/aadl/demo-arinc653/
AADL and code generation
15ATC-0238 14
SAE INTERNATIONAL
1. Capturing architecture key elements using AADL
• Real-time architecture, ARINC653 patterns, etc.
2. Link them to implementation artifacts
• Simulation through code generation
3. Trace them w.r.t. safety analysis objectives
Outline
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System safety process uses many individual methods and analyses, e.g.
hazard analysis
failure modes and effects analysis
fault trees
Markov processes
Related analyses are also useful for other purposes, e.g.
maintainability
availability
Integrity
Goal: a general facility for modeling fault/error/failure behaviors that can 
be used for several modeling and analysis activities.
AADL Error Model Scope and Purpose
SAE ARP 4761 Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety 
Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment 
Annotated architecture model permits checking for consistency and 
completeness between these various declarations.
System
Component
Subsystem
Capture FMEA model
Capture hazards
Capture risk mitigation architecture
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Automation of SAE ARP4761 System Safety Assessment Practice
& EMV2FHA
Spreadsheet
Uses error sources
FTA
CAFTA, OpenFTA
Uses composite
error behavior
Markov Chain
PRISM
Uses error flows 
& behavior 
FMEA
Spreadsheet
Uses error flows &
propagations
RBD/DD
OSATE plugin
Uses composite 
error behavior
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Annotating the model with Error Information (1)
Declaring error sources
Documenting the error
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Annotating the model with Error Information (2)
Passing the error directly
through components features
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Annotating the model with Error Information (3)
Receiving a erroneous value
makes the component to fail
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Functional Hazard Assessment:
• List all potential error sources, Include documentation from the model
Fault Impact Analysis
• Bottom-up approach, Trace the error flow defined in the architecture
Fault Tree
EMV2 at work
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AADLv2 leveraged to model the ADIRU system
• Full architectural description of the avionics system
• Link with consistency checks for ARINC653 patterns
• Code generation towards ARINC653 APEX
• Safety analysis using the AADL EMV2 annex
AADL ecosystem provide all required tools, using OSATE2 and Ocarina, 
completed with spreadsheets, FTA tool and target RTOS
Future work will consider connection with requirement engineering, and 
better coverage of faulty scenarios 
Conclusion
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